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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
CaseNo.20060769-CA 
v. : 
ROBERT NICHOLAS DESPATN, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of possession of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (West 2004), and driving 
under the influence of alcohol/drugs, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 41-6-44 (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issues 
1. Did police have probable cause to arrest defendant for driving under the influence 
of alcohol or drugs when witnesses reported his dangerous and erratic driving pattern, he 
crashed into a parked trailer off the road, his speech was slurred, and he behaved erratically? 
2. Was the search of defendant's car permissible under the automobile exception? 
Standard of Review 
"In search and seizure cases, we review the district court's factual findings 'under a 
clearly erroneous standard.'" State v. Ranquist, 2005 UT App 482, f 5, 128 P.3d 1201 
(quoting State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 15,103 P.3d 699). "We review the trial court's legal 
conclusions for correctness, giving no deference to the court's application of the law to the 
facts." Id. (citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES 
The following constitutional provisions and statutes are attached at Addendum A: 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.30 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 2,2004, the State filed an information charging defendant with two counts 
of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, second and third 
degree felonies (Count I - methamphetamine; Count II - marijuana), driving under the 
influence (Count III), and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia (Count IV). Rl-3 . 
Defendant moved to suppress the drugs and paraphernalia discovered in his vehicle 
during a police search. R29-39. After a hearing, the court denied defendant's motion. 
R127; R316 (motion hearing). Defendant objected to the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law proposed by the State. R136-37. On October 28, 2005, the court heard further 
argument regarding the theories justifying the search, and again denied the motion. 
Rl 80-81; R322 (hearing). On December 16,2005, the court made final amendments to the 
2 
State's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Rl 82-83; see Rl 84-90 (Second 
Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order) (attached at Addendum B); see 
also R322 (hearing). 
This Court denied defendant's petition for interlocutory appeal. R249. 
Defendant subsequently entered a guilty plea to a reduced count of possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, and driving under the influence, a class B 
misdemeanor, reserving his right to appeal the suppression issue. R290-99. On July 28, 
2006, the trial court sentenced defendant to serve statutory terms concurrently on both 
counts, and suspended the prison term. R303-04. 
Defendant timely appealed. R306. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of May 6,2004, defendant smashed his car into a parked trailer after 
he swerved in and out of his lane of traffic. R316:4, 6-7. Three eyewitnesses informed the 
investigating officers of his erratic driving pattern, and they and attending medical personnel 
noted that he was acting erratically, his speech was slurred, and he was paranoid about the 
contents of his car. R316:6-9, 22, 29, 36-37. The officers recovered large quantities of 
marijuana and methamphetamine from defendant's vehicle. R316:40. Following an 
evidentiary hearing, the court made the following factual findings: 
1. On May 6, 2004, Deputy Edward Spotten of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriffs Office was dispatched to 2660 South 8000 West on a reported 
traffic accident. [R316:4] 
2. Arriving upon the scene at approximately 6:25 p.m., Deputy Spotten 
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observed that a 2001 Blue Saturn SL2 was the vehicle involved in the 
accident. [R316:5, 18] 
3. Deputy Spotten observed that this was a single car accident and the car 
had crashed into the back end of a parked trailer off the side of the 
road. [R316:4] 
4. Deputy Spotten encountered the defendant, Robert Nicholas Despain, 
who was the driver of the vehicle. Deputy Spotten also encountered 
three other witnesses. [R316:4, 6] 
5. Deputy Spotten approached the defendant to ask some questions. At 
this time, the defendant was leaning against the trailer. In response to 
Deputy Spotten's questions, the defendant denied having consumed 
alcohol or having used any drugs. [R316:7-8, 12-13] 
6. Deputy Spotten noticed that the defendant's speech was slurred while 
he was speaking with him. [R316:29] 
7. Deputy Spotten did not smell the odor of alcohol nor marijuana 
emanating from the defendant. [R316:13, 15, 32] 
8. Deputy Spotten did not observe drugs or paraphernalia in "plain view" 
prior to the search. [R316:25] 
9. The three other witnesses, Brett Lowe, Sasha Strasburg, and Marsha 
Gallyer, described to Deputy Spotten what they had observed. They 
told Deputy Spotten that they had observed the defendant driving 
erratically that [sic] prior to striking the parked trailer. Specifically, 
they indicated that the defendant ran another car off the road, ran over 
a reflector post, nearly hit a semi tractor trailer, and was swerving 
across the entire road. [R316:6-7]1 
10. After speaking with the witnesses, Deputy Spotten decided that he had 
probable cause to arrest the defendant for Driving Under the Influence 
("DUI") based on the defendant's reported driving pattern, the accident, 
and his demeanor. [R316:8, 15-16, 21, 30-31] 
1
 Deputy Spotten testified not that defendant's car ran over a reflector post, but 
that the car that he ran off the road went over the reflector post. R316:6. 
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11. Deputy Spotten determined that based on probable cause to arrest the 
defendant [for] DUI, the car would be searched "incident to arrest" and 
"for inventory purposes" because the vehicle was to be impounded. 
[R316:8] 
12. Deputy Spotten did not place the defendant under arrest immediately 
because Salt Lake County Fire Department medical personnel had 
arrived and had placed the defendant in the ambulance to treat the cut 
on the defendant's head that he had sustained from the accident. 
[R316:8-9] 
13. B ecause S alt Lake County Fire was preparing to transport the defendant 
to the hospital, Deputy Spotten chose not to administer field sobriety 
tests. [R316:10, 13-14] 
14. Medical personnel indicated to Deputy Spotten that the defendant was 
acting paranoid. They indicated that he was continually worried about 
his car. [R316:8-9, 22] 
15. Medical personnel told Deputy Spotten that the defendant had locked 
his car to keep people out. [R316:9] 
16. Deputy Spotten retrieved the keys for the car from the defendant to 
perform a search of the car. [R316:9] 
17. Deputy Spotten believes that he told the defendant that he was under 
arrest when he retrieved the keys, but does not recall. [R316:9, 17] 
18. After unlocking the car but before performing the search, two 
individuals, one male and one female, claiming to be related to the 
defendant^] arrived on the scene. [R316:9, 24, 39] 
19. These individuals went to the car and the male attempted to retrieve a 
backpack from the back seat. [R316:9] 
20. Deputy Spotten instructed the male to stop and return the backpack to 
the car. [R316:9-10, 24-25] 
21. Sergeant Jason Mazuran of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office also 
responded to the scene. [R316:10, 35] 
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22. Sergeant Mazuran interacted [with] and observed the defendant. 
[R316:36, 42] 
23. Sergeant Mazuran described the defendant's behavior as panicked. 
[R316:36-37, 41-42] 
24. In order to assist Deputy Spotten, Sergeant Mazuran initiated an 
inventory search of the vehicle. [R316:[R316:10, 37-38, 43] 
25. The search of the vehicle commenced at approximately 6:45 p.m. 
[R316:19] 
26. Sergeant Mazuran characterized the search of the vehicle as an 
inventory search, in preparation for the vehicle's State Tax 
Impoundment. [R316:37-38] 
27. Sergeant Mazuran was aware of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office 
procedure for impounding vehicles. [R316:38, 40, 43, 47] 
28. The policy required that the vehicle be searched, items located and 
listed on an inventory. [R316:27-28, 38, 43-44] 
29. As he found particular items in the vehicle, Sergeant Mazuran took 
those items to Deputy Spotten, and indicated orally where the items had 
been found. [R316:44] 
30. Sergeant Mazuran did not personally record in writing the specific 
items found or where they were found. [R316:44, 46] 
31. Sergeant Mazuran did not personally prepare a vehicle impound report 
in this case, but another deputy on the scene did. [R316:45] 
32. While Sergeant Mazuran began the search, medical personnel indicated 
to Deputy Spotten that they were ready to transport the defendant. 
Deputy Spotten followed the ambulance to the hospital. [R316:21] 
3 3. Prior to Deputy Spotten's departure, Deputy Mazuran discovered a bag 
of marijuana in the door compartment on the driver's side. [R316:38-
39] 
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33.2 Deputy Spotten stayed in the defendant's presence at all times at the 
hospital. [R316:11] 
34. After medical personnel were finished, Deputy Spotten clearly 
remembers placing the defendant under arrest. This was at 
approximately 7:20 p.m. [R316:18, 21] 
35. Sergeant Mazuran's search of the vehicle produced a backpack and a 
box. [R316:40] 
34. Sergeant Mazuran's search of the backpack produced marijuana that 
was prepared for distribution. [R316:40] 
35. Deputy Mazuran's search of the box produced a quantity of 
methamphetamine. [R316:40] 
Rl 84-90 (Second Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, attached at 
Addendum B). 
Based on these factual findings, the trial court concluded that "Deputy Spotten had 
probable cause to arrest the defendant for Driving Under the Influence." Rl 88. It based that 
conclusion on "the erratic driving pattern reported by the witnesses, the single car accident 
with a stationary trailer that was off the road, the defendant's panicked and paranoid 
demeanor, and the defendant's slurred speech." Id. The court rejected the legitimacy of the 
search as incident to arrest. Id. And although the court found there was probable cause to 
impound the car under UTAH CODE ANN. 41-6-44.30 (West 2004), it ruled that the 
prosecution had failed to present sufficient information for the court to determine whether 
the inventory search was properly conducted according to departmental policy. Id. 
Nevertheless, the court concluded that "had the vehicle been towed to the impound lot and 
2
 The court's findings use the number "33" twice. 
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a proper inventory search been conducted, the contraband would have been inevitably 
discovered." Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly concluded that defendant's arrest for driving under the 
influence of alcohol or a controlled substance was based on sufficient probable cause: 
Defendant's sustained, erratic driving pattern—running another car off the road, swerving 
in and out of his lane of traffic, nearly hitting a semi-tractor trailer, and then colliding with 
a parked trailer on the side of the road—strongly indicated chemical impairment; when the 
officer who first arrived at the scene contacted defendant, he found defendant's speech to be 
slurred; at the scene, medical personnel and another officer witnessed defendant acting 
paranoid and erratic. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the officers had sufficient 
probable cause to believe that defendant was driving under the influence. 
The trial court's ultimate conclusion, that the search of defendant's car was justified, 
was correct, albeit on different grounds than relied on by the court. The court ultimately 
concluded that evidence of defendant's possession of contraband would inevitably have been 
discovered following a properly conducted inventory search at the impound lot. Aplt. Br. at 
16-23. The State concedes that this ruling was mistaken because no evidence showed that 
the police would have conducted a second inventory search. Nevertheless, the court's 
ultimate conclusion should be affirmed on an alternative ground: The search was justified 
under the automobile exception. 
Under the automobile exception, even if a car is not readily mobile, police may search 
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the vehicle if probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband. The scope of an 
otherwise justified search under the automobile exception extends not only to the interior of 
the vehicle, but also to closed containers within. The record is unclear whether defendant's 
car was mobile after he crashed it into a trailer by the side of the road. Nevertheless, the 
search of the interior of the car, and the box and backpack within, was justified under the 
automobile exception because the officers had probable cause to believe that contraband was 
in defendant's car: Undisputed evidence showed that defendant drove dangerously and 
erratically and that his speech was slurred, indicating recent impairment. He also exhibited 
unusual paranoia about the contents of his car, and he called two family members to remove 
items from the car before the officers could search it. Those facts which, along with facts 
indicating drug impairment, would have indicated to an experienced police officer that there 
might be contraband in defendant's car. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE DID NOT 
VIOLATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
Defendant asserts that "the arresting officer did not have probable cause to place the 
Defendant under arrest for Driving Under the Influence and therefore the officer obtained 
evidence in violation of the Defendant's constitutional rights . . . ." Aplt. Br. at 10.3 
Specifically, he argues that the factors relied upon by the trial court "are clearly insufficient 
to establish probable cause to arrest the Defendant for Driving Under the Influence of alcohol 
or a controlled substance." Aplt. Br. at 14. Defendant agrees with the court's conclusion that 
the search of his vehicle was not justified under the "search-incident-to-lawful-arrest" 
exception, and that the inventory search was not properly conducted. Aplt. Br. at 17. 
Therefore, defendant challenges the trial court's ultimate conclusion, that the contraband 
would have been inevitably discovered in a subsequent properly conducted inventory search. 
Id 
Contrary to defendant's claim, his arrest and the police search of his vehicle did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment. The trial court correctly concluded that the officers had 
probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI. And because an even greater quantum of 
3
 Although defendant claims that the search violated his rights under both the 
federal and state constitutions, he has not engaged in any independent analysis for his 
state constitutional claim. Therefore, this Court should only consider his claim under the 
federal constitution. See State v. Griffith, 2006 UT App 291, f 6 n.l, 141 P.3d 602 (citing 
State v. Rynhart, 2005 UT 84, \ 12, 125 P.3d 938). "Without analysis, the court can make 
no informed decision regarding whether the state constitutional provision in question was 
intended to mirror its federal counterpart... ." Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT 
26, % 75, 73 P.3d 334. 
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evidence establishes probable cause to believe that contraband would be found in defendant's 
car, the officers also were entitled to search the car under the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement. In sum, the police acted within the constraints of the Fourth 
Amendment, and, consequently, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
suppress the evidence recovered from his car. 
A. The police had probable cause to arrest based on his erratic and 
dangerous driving pattern, his paranoid and erratic behavior, and his 
slurred speech. 
Defendant challenges the trial court's determination that Deputy Spotten had probable 
cause to arrest him for driving under the influence. He argues that the "only factors" 
presented by the State to establish probable cause were that "witnesses observed the 
Defendant driving erratically before the accident" and that "emergency personnel told Deputy 
Spotten that the Defendant kept worrying about objects inside his vehicle." Aplt. Br. at 14. 
"These factors alone," he contends, "are clearly insufficient to establish probable cause to 
arrest the Defendant." Id. Although defendant identifies additional evidence supporting 
probable cause, namely, his panicked and paranoid behavior, see id., he does not include it 
in his analysis under the totality of the circumstances. More importantly, because defendant 
misapprehends the test for probable cause, his claim fails. The trial court properly concluded 
that police had probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI. 
"[T]o justify a warrantless arrest 'an officer must have probable cause . . . to believe 
that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense.'" State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT App 
96, f 10, 89 P.3d 185 (quoting State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, f 26, 57 P.3d 1052) (additional 
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citations and internal quotations omitted). "[W]e do not examine these facts in isolation, but 
rather, we examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether '"a prudent person, 
or one of reasonable caution would believe, based upon the circumstances shown, that the 
suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit"' the offense for which he is 
arrested." Id. at % 11 (quoting State v. Chansamone, 2003 UT App 107, f 11, 69 P.3d 293 
and State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, \ 27, 57 P.3d 1052). "[P]robable cause is '"only the 
probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity."'" State v. Spurgeon, 904 
P.2d 220,227 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted). "[I]t does not demand any showing 
that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false." Griffith, 2006 UT App 291, f^ 7 
(quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)). Rather, "[a] 'practical, nontechnical' 
probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required." Id. 
Defendant asserts that Deputy Spotten lacked probable cause because defendant could 
drive erratically and act paranoid about the contents of his car for several innocent reasons. 
Aplt. Br. at 14-15. However, "[ajlthough there might be innocent explanations for particular 
conduct, it is not necessary that all legitimate reasons be absent before an officer finds 
probable cause." State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 535 (Utah 1994). In this case, although 
defendant has explained his conduct, post hoc, in innocent terms, this does not eviscerate 
probable cause. Indeed, in finding probable cause, this Court need not hold that the 
inferences of criminal behavior outweigh those of innocent behavior. See Griffith, 2006 UT 
App 291, Tf 7. The facts presented by the State at the suppression hearing show that there was 
at least a "probability . . . of criminal activity." Id.; See R191-95 (Addendum B). 
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An officer has probable cause to arrest when there is a probability that a person 
"operate[d] or [was] in actual physical control of a vehicle . . . [and] is under the influence 
of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to the degree that 
renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle." UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-
44(2)(a)(ii) (West 2004).4 The evidence established probable cause that defendant was 
driving under the influence of drugs. Deputy Spotten arrived on the scene of a single car 
accident, in which defendant had "crashed into the back end of a parked trailer off the side 
of the road." R184. Deputy Spotten spoke briefly with defendant, who was leaning against 
the trailer, and noticed that defendant's speech was slurred. R185. In Deputy Spotten's 
experience, slurred speech indicated that a suspect might be under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol. R316:31. Three eyewitnesses "told Deputy Spotten that they had observed 
defendant driving erratically... swerving across the entire road." R185. Specifically, they 
saw him run another car off the road, causing it to run over a reflector post. R316:6. 
Defendant, they said, continued driving west on highway 201, "driving erratically." R316:7. 
When defendant reached the intersection of 80th West, he swerved in front of a semi-truck 
to make a left-hand turn, nearly getting hit. Id. Defendant made the turn, and continued 
south on 80th West, "again driving erratically, barely staying on the road, and then . . . 
swerved left of center and crashed in the back of the parked trailer." Id. Medical personnel 
told Deputy Spotten that defendant was acting paranoid about the items in his car. R316:22; 
4
 In 2005, the Legislature renumbered this section as UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-
502 (West Supp. 2006.) 2005 Utah Laws 56-60. However, because the arrest and search 
took place in 2004, the State refers to the statutes in force at the time of the offense. 
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Rl 86. In Deputy Spotten's experience, "after an accident most people aren't going to worry 
about that at all." Id. Deputy Mazuran verified that defendant was acting panicked. Rl 86; 
316:36-37. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, defendant's driving pattern substantially 
increased the probability that defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance, 
and was "incapable of safely operating [his] vehicle." Utah CODE ANN. § 44-6-44(2)(a)(ii) 
(West 2004). Defendant did not merely veer off the road and strike a parked trailer; he 
endangered the lives of several other drivers as he swerved in and out of his lane, forced 
another motorist off the road, and nearly crashed into a semi truck. Rl 84-85; R316:7. This 
driving pattern indicated to Deputy Spotten, based upon his experience and training as an 
officer, that defendant "was under the influence of something." R316:8. At the accident 
scene, defendant was leaning against the trailer and his speech was slurred, further increasing 
the probability that defendant had been driving while impaired. R185. Moreover, Deputy 
Spotten did not witness any other indicia of alcoholic intoxication, which implicitly 
suggested to Deputy Spotten that defendant was under the influence of a controlled 
substance. R316:8. Although Deputy Spotten did not perform further sobriety tests at the 
scene, he explained that he does not perform sobriety tests after an accident. R316:8, 14. 
These factors, in combination, established probable cause that defendant was driving under 
the influence. See Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 227 ("Probable cause is only the probability, and 
not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity." (citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
Therefore, defendant's arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
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B. The search was permissible under the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement because the officers had probable cause to believe that controlled 
substances or evidence of crime were inside defendant's vehicle. 
The trial court's ultimate conclusion, that the search of defendant's car was justified, 
was correct, albeit on different grounds than relied on by the court. Here, notwithstanding 
probable cause to arrest and to impound defendant's car, the trial court ruled that the 
prosecution failed to show that there was sufficient information that the inventory search was 
conducted according to policy. Rl 88.5 Nevertheless, the court upheld the warrantless search 
because the evidence would inevitably have been discovered in a second, properly conducted 
inventory search at the impound lot. The State concedes that the court's ruling was mistaken 
because no evidence showed that the police would have conducted a second inventory 
search. See State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ^ f 14, 76 P.3d 1159 (requiring prosecution to 
demonstrate that police would have inevitably discovered the improperly discovered 
evidence through other lawful means. 2003 UT 30, <[ 14. Nevertheless, the court's ultimate 
conclusion should be affirmed on the alternative ground that the search was justified under 
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 
"[A]n appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from 'if it is sustainable on 
any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs 
from that stated by the [district] court to be the basis of its ruling . . . , was not raised in the 
5
 The trial court also ruled that the search was not justified incident to arrest. 
R188. On appeal, the State neither concedes that the court's rejection of its search-
incident-to-arrest or inventory-search theories was correct, but does not contend that it 
was incorrect. 
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lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court.'" State v. Robison, 
2006 UT 65, % 19, 147 P.3d 448 (quoting Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ^  10, 52 P.3d 1158 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Generally, the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches and seizures, unless 
the search falls under an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 
979, 985 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). One of those recognized exceptions is the "automobile 
exception." Generally, '"[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it 
contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment... permits police to search the vehicle without 
more.'" State v.Griffith, 2006 UT App 291, f 6,141 P.3d 602 (quoting Maryland v. Dyson, 
527 U.S. 465,467 (1999)) (additional citations omitted). The State need not show a separate 
exigency. '"[A vehicle] search is not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the 
issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not been actually obtained.'" Maryland 
v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) (per curiam) (emphasis in original) (quoting United 
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982)). Further, the scope of a search justified under the 
automobile exception extends not only to the interior of the vehicle, but also to closed 
containers within. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999) ("When there is 
probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers . . . to 
examine packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for 
each one.") 
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/. The automobile exception applies even if a defendant's car is immobilized by an 
accident. 
The automobile exception does not necessarily hinge upon whether a vehicle is readily 
mobile. "It is thus clear that the justification to conduct such a warrantless [vehicle] search 
does not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon a reviewing 
court's assessment of the likelihood in each particular case that the car would have been 
driven away, or that its contents would have been tampered with, during the period required 
for the police to obtain a warrant." Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (per 
curiam). Indeed, the exception applies "even after it has been impounded and is in police 
custody." Id. (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). Although the car's ready 
mobility "alone was perhaps the original justification for the vehicle exception, [the United 
States Supreme Court's] cases have made clear that ready mobility is not the only basis for 
the exception." California v. Carney, All U.S. 386, 391 (1985). "Even in cases where an 
automobile was not immediately mobile, the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its 
use as a readily mobile vehicle justified application of the vehicular exception." Id. 
Under Carney, the automobile exception extends to automobiles immobilized due to 
a recent accident. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 7.2(b) at 555 (4th ed. 
2004) ("[I] fit appears that the car has only recently and suddenly become disabled (perhaps 
as a result of an accident while pursued by police), then it seems likely that the Carney 
doctrine is applicable. True, the car is not 'readily mobile,' but its recent use as 
transportation establishes the 'reduced expectation of privacy' which the language of Carney 
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. . . makes the dominant consideration."); see also Cady v. Dumbrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 
442-43 (1973) (holding that search of car disabled by accident, while stored in police 
impound lot, was reasonable under automobile exception); United States v. Donnelly, 475 
F.3d 946,955 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding automobile exception applicable after accident); State 
v. Vassar, 99 P.3d 987, 999 (Wyo. 2004) (rejecting argument that automobile exception did 
not apply simply because defendant "was hospitalized and his vehicle was damaged and 
allegedly immobile"). 
In this case, defendant had recently operated his vehicle, causing an accident on a 
public road. R184. Although the record does not indicate whether defendant's car was 
readily mobile after the accident, it was clearly readily mobile prior to the accident. 
Therefore, the automobile exception applies to the search in this case if the police had 
probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of crime would be found in 
defendant's vehicle. See Thomas, 458 U.S. at 261; Carney, All U.S. at 391. 
Moreover, an independent exigency justified the search. Defendant had called "family 
members" to remove items from the vehicle, and they attempted to do so as soon as the car 
doors were unlocked. R186, R316:37, 39. Thus, the officers were on notice even before 
they searched the car that a search was necessary to prevent the destruction or removal of 
evidence. See State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) (noting that "[n]umerous 
cases have sustained warrantless entries where the circumstances indicated that evidence 
might be destroyed or removed if entry was delayed until a warrant could be obtained," and 
citing cases) (emphasis added); State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
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(finding exigent circumstances to search when truck was being towed away and officers 
faced situation where defendants were not under arrest and could "have gone with the tow 
truck and removed any incriminating items"). 
2. Under the totality of the circumstances, the police had probable cause to believe 
that defendant's car contained contraband or evidence of crime. 
As discussed above, supra point A, "probable cause is ' "only the probability, and not 
a prima facie showing, of criminal activity.'"" State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 227 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted). "[I]t does not demand any showing that such a belief be 
correct or more likely true than false. A 'practical, nontechnical' probability that 
incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required." Griffith, 2006 UT App 291, f 7 
(quoting Brown, 460 U.S. at 742). In this case, the officers had probable cause to believe that 
defendant's vehicle contained contraband or other evidence of crime, justifying their search 
under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 
When officers arrived at the scene, the circumstances of defendant's car accident 
raised their suspicions that defendant was driving under the influence of drugs: Defendant 
had swerved off of the road and struck a parked trailer. R184. These suspicions were 
confirmed when Deputy Spotten interviewed several witnesses who explained defendant's 
erratic driving pattern. R185. This evidence alone would not be sufficient to establish 
probable cause that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of crime. However, Deputy 
Spotten was also informed by paramedics that defendant was "acting paranoid." R186. 
Additionally, Deputy Spotten observed that defendant's speech was slurred. All of this 
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evidence suggested to the officer that defendant was DUI for drugs. R316:8. As argued 
above, see Pt. A, this evidence sufficiently justified the trial court's ruling that there was 
probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI. R186. This evidence, however, augmented by 
evidence of defendant's highly suspect concern about his car—he was "continually worried 
about his car" and its contents—gave rise to probable cause that defendant's DUI was related 
to existence of contraband inside the car. R186. 
In the suppression hearing, Deputy Spotten explained why this behavior was unusual: 
Q: Is it common when people are at an accident scene and they know their car 
is being towed they want to secure any personal items, valuables that may 
be in the vehicle, before it is towed? 
A: Not to this extent usually, no. Usually they - they're usually just - when 
people are in accidents they usually don't have concerns of the car until 
later on. Then they'll come back and call us and say, "I left this in my car." 
Usually after an accident most people aren't going to worry about that at 
all. 
Q: So if somebody has got stereo equipment, CDs? 
A: Typically not. Typically, not -
Q: Laptops? 
A: Typically not the ones that I see, no. 
Q: They're not going to be concerned at all about making sure those items are 
secure before their vehicle is towed to Impound? 
A: In my training and experience in the accident field, that's not something 
they are. Most people are concerned about their injuries and what's going 
to happen to them. 
R316:23. Defendant had even "locked his car to keep people out." R186. Sergeant Mazuran 
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confirmed that defendant was acting panicked. R186. 
Moreover, "[ajfter unlocking the car but before performing the search, two 
individuals, one male and one female, claiming to be related to the defendant arrived on the 
scene." R186. "These individuals went to the car and the male attempted to retrieve a 
backpack from the back seat." R186. Sergeant Mazuran testified that "[i]t was very 
suspicious how it was done," and ordered the male to return the backpack to the car. Rl 86, 
316:39. When Sergeant Mazuran searched the car, he found a baggie of marijuana in the 
compartment of the driver's door, a backpack containing marijuana that was prepared for 
distribution, and a box containing methamphetamine. Rl 87-88. 
The officers had probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of crime was 
in the car. The totality of the circumstances provided the officers with the "probability that 
incriminating evidence [was] involved." Griffith, 2006 UT App 291, f^ 7. This included the 
following evidence: The unusual circumstances of defendant's accident; his reportedly 
dangerous and erratic driving pattern preceding the accident; his demeanor and slurred 
speech; his paranoia regarding the contents of his locked car; and his summoning two 
individuals to remove items from the vehicle just before the police began their search. When 
viewed together, these circumstances established probable cause to believe that defendant 
was under the influence of a controlled substance, and that there was evidence of that 
substance inside the vehicle. 
Because the automobile exception applies in this case and the officers had probable 
cause, the warrantless search of defendant's car was reasonable. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress on the alternative ground that 
the search of defendant's car was justified under the automobile exception, and that it affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J-if day of April, 2007. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
Addendum A 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment IV. Search and seizure 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
MOTOR VEHICLES 
§ 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination 
of both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration—Measure-
ment of blood or breath alcohol—Criminal punishment—Arrest without 
warrant—Penalties—Suspension or revocation of license 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "assessment" means an in-depth clinical interview with a licensed 
mental health therapist: 
(i) used to determine if a person is in need of: 
(A) substance abuse treatment that is obtained at a substance abuse 
program; 
(B) an educational series; or 
(C) a combination of Subsections (l)(a)(i)(A) and (B); and 
(ii) that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
in accordance with Section 62A-15-105. 
(b)(i) "conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(A) this section; 
(B) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driv-
ing under Subsections (9) and (10); 
(C) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled sub-
stance that is taken illegally in the body; 
(D) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol, any drug, or a 
combination of both-related reckless driving adopted in compliance with 
Section 41-6-43; 
(E) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; 
(F) Subsection 58-37-8(2)(g); 
(G) a violation described in Subsections (l)(b)(i)(A) through (F), which 
judgment of conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402; or 
(H) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United 
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States which 
would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol, any drug, or a 
combination of both-related reckless driving if committed in this state, 
including punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815; 
(ii) A plea of guilty or no contest to a violation described in Subsections 
(l)(b)(i)(A) through (H) which plea is held in abeyance under Title 77, 
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, even if the 
charge has been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance with the 
plea in abeyance agreement, for purposes of: 
(A) enhancement of penalties under: 
(I) this Chapter 6, Article 5, Driving While Intoxicated and Reckless 
Driving; and 
(II) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; and 
(B) expungement under Section 77-18-12. 
(c) "educational series" means an educational series obtained at a sub-
stance abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(d) "screening" means a preliminary appraisal of a person: 
(i) used to determine if the person is in need of: 
(A) an assessment; or 
(B) an educational series; and 
(ii) that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
in accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(e) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the func-
tion of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death; 
(f) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a substance 
abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(g) j 'substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed substance 
abuse program; 
(h) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance 
similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; and 
(i) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to 
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person 
exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical 
test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
.08 grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influ-
ence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable 
of safely operating a vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater 
at the time of operation or actual physical control; 
(iv)(A) is 21 years of age or older; 
(B) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent 
chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .05 grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(C) has a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of 
operation or actual physical control; and 
(D) committed the offense within ten years of a prior conviction; or 
(v)(A) is 21 years of age or older; 
(B) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .05 grams or 
greater at the time of operation or actual physical control; 
(C) has a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of 
operation or actual physical control; and 
(D) committed the offense within ten years of a prior conviction. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been 
legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any charge of 
violating this section. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath 
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3)(a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsec-
tions (2)(a)(i) through (iii) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result 
of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of 
the offense; or 
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 years of 
age in the vehicle at the time of the offense. 
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third 
degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon 
another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent 
manner. 
(c) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2)(a)(iv) or (v) is guilty 
of: 
(i) a class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) a class A misdemeanor if the person has also inflicted bodily injury 
upon another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a 
negligent manner. 
(4)(a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first convic-
tion, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require 
the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 48 
hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic moni-
toring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or 
"home confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an assessment, if it is found 
appropriate by a screening under Subsection (4)(c)(i); 
(iii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the court 
does not order substance abuse treatment as described under Subsection 
(4)(d); and 
(iv) impose a fine of not less than $700. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if 
the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse 
treatment is appropriate. 
(e)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii), the court may order 
probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol 
level of .16 or higher, the court shall order probation for the person in 
accordance with Subsection (14). 
(5)(a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten years of a 
prior conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require 
the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 240 
hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic moni-
toring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or 
home confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an assessment, if it is found 
appropriate by a screening under Subsection (5)(c)(i); 
(iii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the court 
does not order substance abuse treatment as described under Subsection 
(5)(d); and 
(iv) impose a fine of not less than $800. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if 
the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse 
treatment is appropriate. 
(e) The court shall order probation for the person in accordance with 
Subsection (14). 
(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if 
it is: 
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten years of 
two or more prior convictions; or 
(ii) at any time after a conviction of: 
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is committed 
after July 1, 2001; or 
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after July 1, 
2001. 
(b) Any conviction described in this Subsection (6) which judgment of 
conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402 is a conviction for purposes of 
this section. 
(c) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution of 
a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall 
impose: 
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours. 
(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court shall impose an order requiring 
the person to obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse 
treatment at a substance abuse treatment program providing intensive care 
or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow-through after 
treatment for not less than 240 hours. 
(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(c), if the 
court orders probation, the probation shall be supervised probation which 
may include requiring the person to participate in home confinement through 
the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may 
not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or 
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this 
section may not be terminated. 
(8)(a)(i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a sentenc-
ing court to order a convicted person to: participate in a screening; an 
assessment, if appropriate; and an educational series; obtain, in the discretion 
of the court, substance abuse treatment; obtain, mandatorily, substance abuse 
treatment; or do a combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a 
violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding screening, assess-
ment, an educational series, or substance abuse treatment in connection 
with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under Section 41-6-44.6 or 
41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court would render in connection 
with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent conviction 
requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6). 
(b)(i) The court shall notify the Driver License Division if a person fails to: 
(A) complete all court ordered: 
(I) screening; 
(II) assessment; 
(III) educational series; 
(IV) substance abuse treatment; and 
(V) hours of work in compensatory-service work program; or 
(B) pay all fines and fees, including fees for restitution and treatment 
costs. 
(ii) Upon receiving the notification described in Subsection (8)(b)(i), the 
division shall suspend the person's driving privilege in accordance with 
Subsections 53-3-221(2) and (3). 
(9)(a)(i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a 
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under 
Section 41-6-43, or of Section 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute 
for, an original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state 
for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not there had 
been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant 
in connection with the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows whether 
there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant, in connection with the violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered 
under this Subsection (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation of Section 
41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45. 
(c) The court shall notify the Driver License Division of each conviction of 
Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9). 
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of 
this section when the peace officer has probable cause to believe the violation 
has occurred, although not in the peace officer's presence, and if the peace 
officer has probable cause to believe that the violation was committed by the 
person. 
(ll)(a) The Driver License Division shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted for 
the first time under Subsection (2); 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any subse-
quent offense under Subsection (2) or i£ the person has a prior conviction 
as defined under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed within a 
period of ten years from the date of the prior violation; and 
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the court 
under Subsection (12). 
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension of 
revocation period the number of days for which a license was previously 
suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension, 
was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is 
based. 
(12)(a)(i) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court 
may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation of 
Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90 days, 
180 days, one year, or two years to remove from the highways those persons 
who have shown they are safety hazards. 
(ii) The additional suspension or revocation period provided in this 
Subsection (12) shall begin the date on which the individual would be 
eligible to reinstate the individual's driving privilege for a violation of 
Subsection (2). 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this Subsec-
tion (12)(b), the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License Division 
an order to suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges for a specified 
period of time. 
(13)(a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement 
through the use of electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall alert 
the appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, law enforcement 
units, or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which 
require: 
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of the 
person, so that the person's compliance with the court's order may be 
monitored; and 
(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring. 
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection 
(13)(e) to place an electronic monitoring device on the person and install 
electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the person or other 
specified location. 
(d) The court may: 
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to include a 
substance abuse testing instrument; 
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during the 
time the person is subject to home confinement; 
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person to 
attend school educational classes, or employment and to travel directly 
between those activities and the person's home; and 
(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement if 
the person is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be 
administered directly by the appropriate corrections agency, probation moni-
toring agency, or by contract with a private provider. 
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers by 
tne court under Subsection (13)(d)(iv). 
(14)(a) If supervised probation is ordered under Section 41-6-44.6 or Sub-
section (4)(e) or (5)(e): 
(i) the court shall specify the period of the probation; 
(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of the probation; and 
(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation. 
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in this section by 
contract with a probation monitoring agency or a private probation provider. 
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall monitor 
the person's compliance with all conditions of the person's sentence, condi-
tions of probation, and court orders received under this article and shall 
notify the court of any failure to comply with or complete that sentence or 
those conditions or orders. 
(d)(i) The court may waive all or part of the costs associated with proba-
tion if the person is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(ii) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall cover 
the costs of waivers by the court under Subsection (14)(d)(i). 
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) and there is 
admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level of .16 or higher, 
the court shall order the following, or describe on record why the order or 
orders are not appropriate: 
(a) treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d), (5)(d), or (6)(d); and 
(b) one or both of the following: 
(i) the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of 
probation for the person in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or 
(ii) the imposition of home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
§ 41—6—44.30. Seizure and impoundment of vehicles by peace officers— 
Impound requirements—Removal of vehicle by owner 
(1) If a peace officer arrests or cites the operator of a vehicle for violating 
Section 41-6-44, 41-6-44.6, or 41-6-44.10, or a local ordinance similar to 
Section 41-6-44 which complies with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the peace officer 
shall seize and impound the vehicle in accordance with Section 41-6-102.5, 
except as provided under Subsection (2). 
(2) If a registered owner of the vehicle, other than the operator, is present at 
the time of arrest, the peace officer may release the vehicle to that registered 
owner, but only if: 
(a) the registered owner: 
(i) requests to remove the vehicle from the scene; and 
(ii) presents to the peace officer sufficient identification to prove owner-
ship of the vehicle or motorboat; 
(b) the registered owner identifies a driver with a valid operator's license 
who: 
(i) complies with all restrictions of his operator's license; and 
(ii) would not, in the judgment of the officer, be in violation of Section 
41-6-44, 41-6-44.6, or 41-6-44.10, or a local ordinance similar to Section 
41-6-44 which complies with Subsection 41-6-43(1), if permitted to oper-
ate the vehicle; and 
(c) the vehicle itself is legally operable. 
(3) If necessary for transportation of a motorboat for impoundment under 
this section, the motorboat's trailer may be used to transport the motorboat. 
Laws 1982, 2nd Sp. Sess., c. 4, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 194, § 1; Laws 1984, c. 37, § 1; 
Laws 1987, c. 138, § 43; Laws 1991, c. 171, § 2; Laws 1992, c. 1, § 187; Laws 1992, c. 
229, § 2; Laws 1996, c. 170, § 44, eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 223, § 3, eff. July 1, 
1996; Laws 1998, c. 125, § 2, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 1998, c. 270, § 15, eff. March 21, 
1998; Laws 2000, c. 334, § 5, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2001, c. 202, § 2, eff. July 1, 2001; 
Laws 2002, c. 200, § 3, eff. July 1, 2002. 
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3UNTY 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ROBERTN.DESPATN, 
Defendant. 
SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF 
FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER 
Case No. 041904962 
JUDGE DENISE POSSE LINDBERG 
Having heard the facts of this case and having heard argument by both parties, the Court 
enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On May 6, 2004, Deputy Edward Spotten of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs 
Office was dispatched to 2660 South 8000 West on a reported traffic accident. 
2. Arriving upon the scene at approximately 6*25 p m , Deputy Spotten observed 
that a 2001 Blue Saturn SL2 was the vehicle involved in the accident. 
3. Deputy Spotten observed that this was a single car accident and the car had 
crashed into the back end of a parked trailer off the side of the road. 
4. Deputy Spotten encountered the defendant, Robert Nicholas Despain, who was 
the driver of the vehicle. Deputy Spotten also encountered three other witnesses. 
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5. Deputy Spotten approached the defendant to ask some questions. At this time, 
the defendant was leaning against the trailer. In response to Deputy Spotten's 
questions, the defendant denied having consumed alcohol or having used any 
drugs. 
6. Deputy Spotten noticed that the defendant's speech was slurred while he was 
speaking with him. 
7. Deputy Spotten did not smell the odor of alcohol nor marijuana emanating from 
the defendant. 
8. Deputy Spotten did not observe drugs or paraphernalia in "plain view" prior to 
the search. 
9. The three other witnesses, Brett Lowe, Sasha Strasburg, and Marsha Gallyer, 
described to Deputy Spotten what they had observed. They told Deputy Spotten 
that they had observed the defendant driving erratically that prior to striking the 
parked trailer. Specifically, they indicated that the defendant ran another car off 
the road, ran over a reflector post, nearly hit a semi tractor trailer, and was 
swerving across the entire road. 
10. After speaking with the witnesses, Deputy Spotten decided that he had probable 
cause to arrest the defendant for Driving Under the Influence ("DUI") based on 
the defendant's reported driving pattern, the accident, and his demeanor. 
11. Deputy Spotten determined that based on probable cause to arrest the 
defendant DUI, the car would be searched "incident to arrest" and "for inventory 
purposes" because the vehicle was to be impounded. 
12. Deputy Spotten did not place the defendant under arrest immediately because Salt 
Lake County Fire Department medical personnel had arrived and had placed the 
defendant in the ambulance to treat the cut on the defendant's head that he had 
sustained from the accident. 
13. Because Salt Lake County Fire was preparing to transport the defendant to the 
hospital, Deputy Spotten chose not to administer field sobriety tests. 
14. Medical persomiel indicated to Deputy Spotten that the defendant was acting 
paranoid. They indicated that he was continually worried about his car. 
15. Medical personnel told Deputy Spotten that the defendant had locked his car to 
keep people out 
16. Deputy Spotten retrieved the keys for the car from the defendant to perform a 
search of the car. 
17. Deputy Spotten believes that he told the defendant that he was under arrest when 
he retrieved the keys, but does not recall. 
18. After unlocking the car but before performing the search, two individuals, one 
male and one female, claiming to be related to the defendant arrived on the scene. 
19. These individuals went to the car and the male attempted to retrieve a backpack 
from the back seat. 
20. Deputy Spotten instructed the male to stop and return the backpack to the car. 
21. Sergeant Jason Mazuran of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office also responded 
to the scene. 
22. Sergeant Mazuran interacted and observed the defendant. 
23. Sergeant Mazuran described the defendant's behavior as panicked. 
24. Li order to assist deputy Spotten, Sergeant Mazuran initiated an inventory search 
of the vehicle. 
25. The search of the vehicle commenced at approximately 6:45 p.m. 
26. Sergeant Mazuran characterized the search of the vehicle as an inventory search, 
in preparation for the vehicle's State Tax Impoundment. 
27. Sergeant Mazuran was aware of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office procedure 
for impounding vehicles. 
28. The policy required that the veliicle be searched, items be located and listed on an 
inventory. 
29. As he found particular items in the vehicle, Sergeant Mazuran took those items to 
Deputy Spotten, and indicated orally where the items had been found. 
30. Sergeant Mazuran did not personally record in writing the specific items found or 
where they were found. 
31. Sergeant Mazuran did not personally prepare a vehicle impound report in this 
case, but another deputy on the scene did. 
32. Wliile Sergeant Mazuran began the search, medical personnel indicated to Deputy 
Spotten that they were ready to transport the defendant. Deputy Spotten followed 
the ambulance to the hospital. 
33. Prior to Deputy Spotten's departure, Deputy Mazuran discovered a bag of 
marijuana in the door compartment on the driver's side. 
33. Deputy Spotten stayed in the defendant's presence at all times at the hospital. 
34. After medical persomiel were finished, Deputy Spotten clearly remembers placing 
the defendant under arrest. This was at approximately 7:20 p.m. 
35. Sergeant Mazuran's search of the vehicle produced a backpack and a box. 
36. Sergeant Mazuran's search of the backpack produced marijuana that was prepared 
for distribution. 
37. Deputy Mazuran's search of the box produced a quantity of methamphetamine. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Deputy Spotten had probable cause to arrest the defendant for Driving Under the 
Influence. The probable cause was based on the erratic driving pattern reported 
by the witnesses, the single car accident with a stationary trailer that was off the 
road, the defendant's panicked and paranoid demeanor, and the defendant's 
slurred speech. 
2. The defendant was not actually placed under arrest at the scene; rather, he was 
placed under arrest at the hospital. 
3. The State's theory of "search incident to arrest" under these facts is not consistent 
with Utah case law. 
4. There was probable cause to impound the car pursuant to Utah Code § 41-6-44.6 
and §41-6-44.30. 
5. Insufficient information was presented to the Court to allow it to conclude, one 
way or another, whether the inventory search was done according to policy. 
6. The State must show that the inventory search was done according to policy. 
7. The State has failed to carry its burden of showing that the inventory search was 
properly carried out. 
8. However, had the vehicle been towed to the impound lot and a proper inventory 
search been conducted, the contraband would have been inevitably discovered. 
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ORDER 
It is hereby ordered that Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is DENIED. 
SIGNED this 16thday of December, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
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